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Abstract 20 
Following devolution in 1999 England and Scotland's National Health Services diverged, 21 
resulting in major differences in hospital payment. England introduced a case payment 22 
mechanism from 2003/4, while Scotland continued to pay through global budgets. We 23 
investigate the impact this change had on activity for Hip Replacement. We examine the 24 
differential financial reimbursement attached for uncemented Hip Replacement in England, 25 
which has been more generous than for its cemented counterpart, although clinical guidance 26 
from the National Institute for Clinical Excellence recommends the later. In Scotland this 27 
financial incentive does not exist. We use a difference-in-difference estimator, using Scotland 28 
as a control, to test whether the change in reimbursement across the two countries had an 29 
influence on treatment. Our results indicate that financial incentives are directly linked to the 30 
faster uptake of the more expensive, uncemented Hip Replacement in England, which ran 31 
against the clinical guidance. 32 
 33 
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1. Introduction 1 
 2 
Many health care systems are using competition within managed care environments, where 3 
for example hospitals face fixed price regulation, to handle the trade-off between cost and 4 
delivery in quality of care. While there is general agreement that the accompanying payment 5 
systems adopted to encourage competition do affect provider performance, empirical 6 
evidence to support this view remains relatively sparse. The empirical evidence that does 7 
exist largely draws on US data relating to the introduction by Medicare of prospective DRG 8 
payment to hospitals in the mid-1980s, and even here few studies consider reactions to 9 
subsequent changes in fixed prices (see, for example Cutler, 1995; Gilman, 2000; Dafny, 10 
2005)
1
. Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff (2010) provide examples of the literature outside of the 11 
USA, as well as evidence on system-wide effects of payment reform in Europe and Asia. Of 12 
this literature few have considered the impact of price increases on activity once a fixed 13 
system is in place (Dafny, 2005; White and Yee, 2013; He and Mellor, 2013). While there 14 
has been analysis of payment incentive effects in the UK, once again the empirical literature 15 




The relative lack of empirical evidence relating to the UK hospital sector and the introduction 18 
and operation of fixed payments is surprising given the extensive reforms that have been 19 
underway in the UK since the mid-1990s. In NHS England, part of the UK National Health 20 
Service (NHS), the introduction of competition amongst hospitals around the mid-2000s has 21 
been argued to promote efficiency and improve quality of outcome within the health care 22 
sector and has been supported by empirical evidence provided by Cooper et al (2011) and 23 
Gaynor et al (2013). These findings are in line with a growing literature on competition and 24 
case-based payment systems (see Gaynor, 2012 for a review)
3
. Such competition has in fact 25 
been accompanied by increased regulation, partly to guarantee that clinical standards are 26 
maintained despite competition for funds. In particular national clinical guidelines, as 27 
specified by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), form the basis 28 
of managing health care within the English NHS. These guidelines cover a wide range of 29 
interventions and are based on assessments of the clinical evidence in specific areas to help to 30 
ensure that providers are maintaining, or even improving quality standards in the delivery of 31 
the care across specific disease areas.  32 
 33 
With NICE already in existence, the English NHS introduced case-based payment system in 34 
2003/4, where they linked individual case groupings – or Health Related Groups (HRGs)4 – 35 
to specific reimbursement rates derived from treatment costs. This case-based payment 36 
system is essentially a form of Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) reimbursement, and is 37 
                                                 
1
 An interesting distinction between the effect of incentive changes on the marginal reimbursement effect 
compared to the average reimbursement effect is made by Cutler (1995), who maps the incentive effects in a 
move from Medicare cost-based reimbursement to DRG reimbursement. This is similar to the change in the UK 
from contract-based reimbursement to Payment by Results (PbR) reimbursement, however the UK contract-
based reimbursement prior to the introduction of PbR was largely based on block contracts covering populations 
rather than reimbursement of the volume of care undertaken. This of course renders the analogy to marginal and 
average reimbursement redundant within the UK setting. 
2
 The literature on related topics within the UK covers, for example, how competition and payment by results 
has affected outcomes (see Gaynor et al, 2012 and Propper, 2012 for reviews of this literature), how it has 
affected the mix of hospital activity (Farrer et al, 2009); how regulation has affected waiting times (Propper et 
al, 2010); GP doctor behaviour and payment by performance (Gravelle et al, 2010). See Busse et al (2011) for 
discussion of the literature on hospital payment systems in Europe. 
3
 Although see Gravelle et al (2012) for a wider view. 
4
 Further specific information on HRGs can be found at (Street and Dawson, 2002; Mason et al. 2011) 
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referred to as Payment by Results (PbR). The PbR reimbursements are nationally agreed 1 
tariffs, set by the Department of Health and used in England by purchasers of health care to 2 
reimburse individual providers -mainly hospitals - for the provision of treatment. The tying of 3 
interventions to specific levels of reimbursement provides a means of testing the importance 4 
of financial consideration in a managed care environment, particularly if clinical guidance 5 
exists within that specific disease area. 6 
 7 
Of particular interest is the case of Hip Replacement, an extremely common procedure with 8 
substitutable treatment options available and where, at least in other systems, patient 9 
preferences and financial incentives have been shown to play a role in treatment up-take 10 
(Doiron, Fiebig and Suziedelyte, 2014). Hip Replacement presents a unique opportunity to 11 
study the incentives created by English PbR payment system. In a Hip Replacement, two 12 
main types of prostheses are available; cemented and uncemented. Both types have been 13 
around since the 1970s and clinical evidence suggests that both prostheses have comparable 14 
rates of success (Abdulkarim et al, 2013). Until recently, the vast majority of Hip 15 
Replacements performed in the UK used cemented prostheses, although the number of 16 
uncemented Hip Replacements undertaken has increased substantially in the past decade. 17 
This change in prosthesis use has coincided with the introduction of separate reimbursement 18 
rates for the two types of prostheses, which provide a more generous surplus for the 19 
uncemented implant, possibly to cover the longer operating times required to fit the 20 
uncemented device.  The increase in up-take of the more generously reimbursed implant is in 21 
spite of recommendations from the NICE that favour the use of cemented prostheses in Hip 22 
Replacements (NICE, 2000; updated in 2013).  While NICE guidance and quality standards 23 
are not absolutely mandatory, they are used by NHS regulators to establish acceptable levels 24 
of care, and if required health care providers must defend any individual treatment decisions 25 
which run contrary to NICE guidance.  26 
 27 
Hip replacements are also of interest because individual hospital providers control the 28 
procurement practices with respect to prostheses; thus managers have potentially more 29 
influence over the type of procedure finally implemented than in other cases.  In their 30 
analysis of procurement practices in the NHS, Davies and Lorgelly (2013), focused on a case-31 
study of Hip Replacement and the purchasing of hip prosthesis. They note that in the UK 32 
NHS, the hospital through its centralised procurement policies – as opposed to the individual 33 
surgeon – determines the specific prostheses to purchase and negotiates quantities and prices 34 
with the suppliers. Individual surgeons feed their preferences into the procurement process; 35 
acting as an agent for their patients by including patient characteristics within their own 36 
surgical preferences. The particular prostheses purchased at the hospital level thus reflect 37 
individual surgeon preferences, historical procurement practices, prices and reimbursement 38 
levels. Davies and Lorgelly (2013), also note that, if volume discounts are available this may 39 
lead to specialisation in prosthesis type. In other words, characteristics of hospital behaviour, 40 
as informed by surgical assessment, will determine the specific prosthesis to be purchased by 41 
any hospital, at any point in time. There will inevitably be a trade-off, at the hospital level, 42 
between management and surgical preferences. However, it is the ability to centralise 43 
procurement decisions and to hold stock that provides a mechanism through which hospitals 44 
can control the type of device, and therefore the revenue generated from this relatively 45 
common procedure. 46 
 47 
With regards to Hip Replacement prosthesis, we have then a situation in the UK NHS, where 48 
England has different fixed DRG-type reimbursement rates (PbR) for two common, 49 
substitutable procedures - cemented and uncemented replacements – while at the same time, 50 
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in England NICE recommends the less expensive cemented replacements above uncemented 1 
replacements in their clinical guidance.  In Scotland, as providers are not reimbursed for 2 
cases treated, no such financial incentive exists to influence choice. This situation provides a 3 
means of analysing, in a controlled manner, the impact financial incentives can have on 4 
specific procedure up-take at the individual hospital level, for a procedure where prosthesis 5 
type does not affect clinical outcome. This provides a unique case-study of individual 6 
hospital purchasing decisions, made through managed procurement practices, where 7 
decisions may be influenced by revenue generation given that prosthesis type has no 8 
influence on patient outcomes. 9 
 10 
The 1999 devolution has presented a natural experiment in health care provision within an 11 
NHS system as England and Scotland have diverged substantially in the reforms they have 12 
implemented to meet their National Health Service objectives –essentially creating two 13 
different NHS systems within the UK (Leys, 1999; Pollock, 1999).  The English NHS has 14 
embraced market mechanisms and cooperation with the private sector, while the Scottish 15 
NHS has moved in the opposite direction, and created a highly centralised system that 16 
maintains trust in its providers to allocate resources effectively, and strives for improvement 17 
through integration (Steele and Cylus, 2014; Greer, 2006).  18 
 19 
One of the main differences in health policy that has emerged in the years following 20 
devolution has been in the funding of inpatient hospital care. Prior to 1997, England and 21 
Scotland funded inpatient care in broadly the same way: health care purchasers and providers 22 
negotiated the services that would be provided through bulk contracts (Ham, 2004). Scotland 23 
has moved away from this funding system and since 2004 has funded inpatient care through 24 
the allocation of global hospital budgets (Scottish Parliament, 2004). England on the other 25 
hand has further supported the internal market by moving away from the bulk contract system 26 
of funding hospital episodes to a fix-priced activity-based payment system, of DRG-type 27 
reimbursement, known as Payment by Results (PbR), introduced in in 2003/04. 28 
 29 
Given the divergence in funding for inpatient activity across the two nations, we use Scottish 30 
NHS hospitals as a control group within a difference-in-difference style estimator, as well as 31 
employing a large number of robustness checks, to test whether the up-take of the more 32 
expensive uncemented prosthesis in England was influenced by reimbursement levels, at a 33 
time when the less expensive cemented prosthesis was being recommended by NICE. Our 34 
results add to the literature on the impact of financial incentives on individual providers in a 35 
managed care setting by providing a specific example. Our conclusions suggest that English 36 
NHS hospitals did indeed have higher up-take rates of the more generously reimbursed 37 
uncemented Hip Replacements than the (Scottish) control group providers after PbR had been 38 
introduced in England, despite the English clinical guidance recommending cemented Hip 39 
Replacements. The ability to hold stock and for hospitals to manage procurement when 40 
acquiring prostheses allows individual in-patient providers of Hip Replacement flexibility in 41 
their purchasing decision. 42 
 43 
The precise question we examine in this paper is: To what extent any observed change in the 44 
selection of Hip Replacement prosthesis type in England, can be related to the financial 45 
incentive introduced by the differential reimbursement of treatment interventions by 46 
DRG/PbR payment? As we document below, in the case of Hip Replacement, the financial 47 
incentive associated with PbR reimbursement provided a signal opposite to that outlined by 48 
the NICE technology appraisal. As such, the examination of this question provides a unique 49 
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study of the impact that financial incentives have on clinical practice in an environment 1 
which is highly regulated, but where individual hospitals have discretion over procurement.  2 
 3 
The paper proceeds by briefly outlining the funding differences that exist in England and 4 
Scotland, as well as highlighting the pattern of prosthesis up-take in both countries over a 10-5 
year period, which motivates the use of Scottish providers as a control. The following 6 
sections outline the data and methods, after which we present results and offer conclusions. 7 
 8 
 9 
2. Background 10 
 11 
This study is concerned with the impact that the different incentives introduced for the 12 
provision of care across England and Scotland had on the uptake of competing procedures; 13 
cemented and uncemented Hip Replacement. Given the timeframe we are particularly 14 
interested in examining the role financial incentives can play in influencing clinical practice. 15 
As previously mentioned, while cemented and uncemented Hip Replacement represent 16 
different procedures both are used to treat similar patients. Cemented replacement is the older 17 
technique (developed about 40 years ago), and is assumed to have a shorter and easier 18 
recovery period, while uncemented replacement, developed 20 years ago, avoids the 19 
possibility of loosening parts and the breaking off of cement particles. To date, clinical 20 
evidence suggests that both have comparable rates of clinical success (Abdulkarim et al, 21 
2013).  22 
 23 
Over the past decade different types of incentives have been introduced that favour one 24 
implant over the other, as demonstrated for the two countries in Figure 1.  25 
 26 
< Insert Figure 1 here > 27 
 28 
Immediately after Devolution, in 2000 NICE, which is based in England, conducted a 29 
technology appraisal (TA2) that recommended that cemented Hip Replacements should be 30 
performed over cementless procedures (NICE, 2000), this was updated in 2013 and the same 31 
guidance was reconfirmed. This guidance is based on the difference in cost between the two 32 
prostheses (cemented being cheaper on average) as there was little long term (10 years or 33 
more) evidence to suggest which implants had better outcomes (in particular, revision rates). 34 
However, with the introduction of PbR in England in 2003/4 financial incentives were 35 
introduced that favoured the uncemented procedures over their cemented counterpart. As of 36 
2003/4, PbR was introduced in England, where reimbursement became based on actual 37 
activity undertaken, defined by Health Related Groups (HRGs)
5
, following a national HRG 38 
tariff.  39 
 40 
PbR was phased in gradually over the years 2003/4 to 2006/7. It was initially introduced for 41 
15 HRGs in its first year of implementation, extended to 33 HRGs in the second year, and 42 
then phased out to cover Foundation Trusts (self-managing NHS hospitals) initially and then 43 
for all providers of elective and emergency inpatient stays during the following years. Hip 44 
Replacement, coded as HGR H02, was one of the first 33 HRG groups to be allocated a 45 
reimbursement level in the phasing out of the PbR policy. After one year, this HRG group 46 
                                                 
5
 While HRGs were initially introduced in the late 1990s as an exercise to help define hospital activity costs 
based on clinically meaningful clinical groupings (Street and Dawson, 2002), it is only under PbR that they 
became attached to reimbursement.   
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(H02) was split into two separate HRGs (H80 and H81), representing cemented and 1 
uncemented primary Hip Replacement respectively, thus moving towards a differential 2 
reimbursement for each of the two procedures from 2005 onwards. This differential 3 
reimbursement continued until a new grouper was introduced in 2009, and the categorization 4 
of HRGs stopped reflecting the type on implant and instead reflected the severity of the 5 
patient. Hip Replacement reimbursement has further changed since the introduction of Best 6 
Practice Tariffs for Hip Fracture in 2010, and these do not differentiate between cemented 7 
and uncemented prostheses either
6
.  8 
 9 
The price of the national HRG tariff, updated yearly, is determined by the average of the 10 
costs calculated by all hospitals for each of their HRGs which includes labour, equipment and 11 
hospital costs, with small cost adjustments for geographical variation, labour market 12 
conditions and excessive length of stay for appropriate reason. There is a three-year delay
7
 13 
between hospitals submitting cost data and these data being converted into prices, and so an 14 
inflationary adjustment is also made to each HRG (Mason et al, 2011). HRG classifications 15 
themselves are updated and refined, through the continual updating of ‘groupers’; the last of 16 
these updates took place in 2009 when HRG 4.0 was phased in.  17 
 18 
Table 1 shows the tariff for the different HRG groupings over this period, alongside the 19 
corresponding average costs. In all years after the separation of HRG H02 into two distinct 20 
HRGs, the tariff for the elective cemented procedure (H80) has been reimbursed at a higher 21 
rate than the elective uncemented procedures, while the tariff for the non-elective procedures 22 
reimburses the uncemented procedure (H81) more highly. Although one might expect this 23 
difference to be linked to the underlying costs of these procedures, this does not appear to be 24 
the case, as illustrated by the national reference costs. These costs show the uncemented 25 
procedure to be cheaper in both settings
8
. In addition, the difference in the underlying cost 26 
and the tariff price is always larger for the uncemented procedures
9
. This suggests that greater 27 
financial surplus is made through performing the uncemented procedure rather than the 28 
cemented, particularly for emergency procedures.  29 
 30 
< Insert Table 1 here > 31 
 32 
An estimate of the average revenue gain, 𝑅𝑗𝑡 , to be made from switching to uncemented 33 
replacement from cemented replacement, for each admission type j, for a given year t, is 34 
presented in the final columns of Table 1; calculated as:  35 
 36 
𝑅𝑗𝑡  = (𝑈𝑇𝑗𝑡 − 𝑈𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗𝑡−3) − (𝐶𝑇𝑗𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶̅̅̅̅ 𝑗𝑡−3) 
                                                 
6
 As Hip Replacement was one of the first 33 conditions introduced, it was phased out to all providers in 2004. 
Thus, all types of English hospitals (Acute Care Trusts, Foundation Trusts) received the same reimbursement. 
This is also true for the introduction of the differential tariff the next year. The only exception to this are the 
ISTC providers who were given a tariff uplift to presumably cover capital costs, however the information on the 
public uplift was not made publicly available. 
7
 Since the introduction of the new HRG grouper in 2009 this has now been reduced to a two-year delay.  
8
 While the uncemented prostheses are on average more expensive than the cemented ones, the surgery is faster 
to perform (approximately 15 min according to Yates et al (2006)) which may account for the lower average 
cost. 
9
 Reference costs are not adjusted for age or other patient characteristics. In their conversion to the tariff they 
undergo data filtering, cleaning, spell conversation, adjustments to reflect tariff scope and structure and price 
adjustments. Also note that these reference costs will not include any discounts to purchasers. 
 
  7 
 1 
where 𝑈𝑇̅̅ ̅̅𝑗𝑡 and 𝐶𝑇𝑗𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ represent the tariff for uncemented and cemented Hip Replacement by 2 
admission type, and 𝑈𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗𝑡 and 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ represent the average cost for the cemented and 3 
uncemented HRGs. As there was a three-year delay between hospitals submitting cost data 4 
and these data being converted into prices, the t-3 subscript is attached to the average costs.   5 
 6 
These estimates indicate that in the case of non-elective Hip Replacement large revenue 7 
gains, approximately £900-£1700 per case, on average, can be made by switching to the 8 
uncemented implant over the period in question. The potential revenue gains are smaller in 9 
the case of the elective surgery, but are for the most part positive, ranging from an 10 
approximate loss of £8 in one specific year, to a gain of about £400 per case on average. The 11 
actual prosthesis prices are bound to influence individual hospital procurement practices 12 
where, as noted above hospital management and clinicians make explicit purchasing 13 
decisions on the type of prosthesis to stock. The national reference costs are used here, as the 14 
commercial prices of prostheses are not publicly available, to indicate potential financial 15 
surplus and are generally regarded as indicative of true treatment costs. These reference costs 16 
are publicly available as averages over all hospitals. The more efficient hospitals have the 17 
potential to make larger financial gains than those indicate above. Moreover, these estimates 18 
of potential gain do not factor in any implant discounts that can be made through negotiations 19 
between individual providers and suppliers. 20 
 21 
In Scotland no differential financial incentives exist, and the technology assessments issued 22 
by NICE also do not automatically apply, as clinical guidance is provided by the Scottish 23 
Medicines Agency.  The NICE guidance relating to Hip Replacement was in fact applied 24 
latterly in Scotland, (although not until 2014), where it was introduced by Healthcare 25 
Improvement Scotland (HIS).  Scotland does however use HRGs to code activity, extending 26 
their use from their pre-devolution implementation. From 2005 onwards Scotland also started 27 
to calculate an HRG Tariff, which was to be used as a costing tool to promote efficiency. The 28 
derivation of the Scottish National tariff is based on the English National Tariff, although 29 
differences do exist. While HRGs and the Scottish National Tariff are used to inform service 30 
delivery, they are not used for reimbursement. Scotland therefore provides a useful control 31 
case to observe the choice of Hip Replacement in a part of the UK NHS were the financial 32 
incentives do not apply.  33 
 34 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 35 
< Insert Figure 3 here > 36 
 37 
Figure 2 illustrates the levels of cemented and uncemented activity across England and 38 
Scotland for the duration of our sample (1996-2012). This figure clearly illustrates the 39 
differential uptake of uncemented procedures in England over the 2000s relative to Scotland. 40 
In particular, it appears that the levels of uncemented procedures in England begin to increase 41 
from about 2002/3, but only begin to coincide with a fall in uncemented activity from about 42 
2004/5 - coinciding with the split of the financial incentive. While the Scottish trends remain 43 
relatively flat in comparison, it appears that from the period 2002/2006, Scotland experiences 44 
an increase in cemented activity, although from 2007 onwards uncemented procedures 45 
increase while cemented activity falls.  46 
 47 
However, as the magnitude of activity in much larger in England, it is perhaps more 48 
informative to also examine the proportions of Hip Replacement activity over the same 49 
period. Figure 3 illustrates the proportion of uncemented cases to the total (uncemented + 50 
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cemented) over the time period being investigated. Up until 2003, the fraction of uncemented 1 
Hip Replacements performed in the two countries remains relatively stable; at about 10% in 2 
England and under 5% in Scotland. In England, and with the introduction of PbR in 2003, the 3 
proportion of uncemented procedures starts to rapidly increase, until it reaches is peak in 4 
2010, making up 50% of the total. In both countries the increase in uncemented proportions 5 
coincides with the wider use of HRGs. In England 2003 is the introduction of PbR, while in 6 
Scotland 2005 marks the introduction of the use of HRGs as a costing/efficiency tool.  7 
 8 
As Table 1 shows the national reference costs for uncemented Hip Replacement are lower for 9 
both Elective and Non-Elective procedures, thus providing hospitals in either country – 10 
operating under a budget or a fixed price reimbursement – to opt for the uncemented Hip 11 
Replacement if pursing efficiency gains by some financially astute providers. The financial 12 
incentive, introduced by split payments, which reimburse the cheaper Uncemented prosthesis 13 
at a higher rate, only magnify this incentive in England. In Scotland, uncemented procedures 14 
also increase but not until 2005, when the National Scottish Tariff was introduced for 15 
managerial - not reimbursement - reasons, and even then the rate of increase is less rapid than 16 
in England and, as shown in Figure 2, is associated with much smaller changes in levels of 17 
activity.  18 
 19 
< Insert Figure 4 here > 20 
 21 
Given that the choice of Hip Replacement procedure is likely to be closely tied with the 22 
procurement practices of prostheses we are also interested in examining the proportion of 23 
cemented and uncemented Hip Replacements undertaken in each hospital, to understand if 24 
the switch to uncemented is driven by particular hospitals switching all their prosthesis or by 25 
a selection of the uncemented procedure for particular types of patients across hospitals. 26 
Figure 4 illustrates the frequency of uncemented Hip Replacement cases to total (uncemented 27 
+ cemented) by provider across England and Scotland for selected years. The first panel 28 
shows the frequencies in 1996, the first year in our data. In this panel, the histogram 29 
illustrates that most providers, in both countries, are not performing any uncemented Hip 30 
Replacements, and those who are, are for the most part performing it in less than 25% of their 31 
cases. The second panel, shows the situation in 2005, a couple years after PbR has been 32 
rolled in. While the situation in Scotland is largely unchanged, in England more providers are 33 
performing some uncemented procedures, with a few providers providing almost entirely 34 
uncemented procedures. In 2009, the last year of the differential incentive in England, we see 35 
that the situation in England is split such that about 50% of providers are performing 36 
uncemented procedures on more than half the of their patients. In Scotland more providers 37 
have started to provide uncemented Hip Replacements – a few providing almost exclusively 38 
uncemented procedures - but the majority continue to provide mostly or exclusively 39 
cemented Hip Replacements. Finally, in 2012 – the last year of our data, England remains 40 
split, such that about half the providers are providing mostly uncemented procedures, and 41 
half mostly cemented, while in Scotland more providers are providing uncemented 42 
procedures but cemented still dominates. 43 
 44 
It is important to note that as activity changes over time as shown by these Figures, with more 45 
providers procuring more uncemented prostheses, any financial incentive does not give rise 46 
to complete substitution. This no doubt partly reflects existing clinical practices and 47 
preferences, as well as the suitability of prosthesis type for individual patients. Any potential 48 
financial incentive is therefore mediated by clinical practice. There is switching on average 49 
across all providers, indicating a common incentive, but the switching is not complete. 50 
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 1 
3. Data 2 
 3 
The data used to conduct this analysis are drawn from two administrative databases; the 4 
English Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) and the Information Services Division (ISD) of 5 
NHS Scotland. Both data sets contain records for all NHS patients admitted to all NHS 6 
hospitals in each country, with information on all medical and surgical specialties performed. 7 
The data also provide information on patient characteristic data (e.g. age), clinical 8 
information (e.g. diagnoses using ICD-10 codes, procedures using OPCS codes and HRG 9 
codes), mode of admission and details where the patient was treated. The HRG codes used in 10 
the ISD data are calculated based on the methodology used in England.  11 
 12 
All individual cases coded with HRG 3.5 grouper codes, H80 and H81 or OPCS codes W371 13 
or W381 for Hip Replacement were extracted for the years 1996-2010, as after this date the 14 
same (Best Practice Tariffs) were applied to all Hip Replacement procedures in England. 15 
Where a different HRG grouper was used, the HRG 3.5 grouper was applied to the data to 16 
allow comparisons across the time period. The change in groupers over the time periods 17 
makes it difficult to use them over the period being investigated, and so we prefer the surgical 18 
OPCS 4 codes to identify uncemented (code W381) and cemented (code W371) procedures 19 
which ensure better consistency. The number of cases for each of the HRG groups and OPCS 20 
categories were aggregated for each hospital, separately for each year of the sample, and 21 
exported into a newly constructed panel, together with aggregated statistics on the patients 22 
treated in each hospital, and hospital status information. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics 23 
on variables of interest.  24 
 25 
< Insert Table 2 here > 26 
 27 
We use the proportion of uncemented Hip Replacement to total (cemented + uncemented) 28 
procedures as the dependent variable in most of our specifications. The proportions variable 29 
allows us to capture relative change across the two Hip Replacement techniques, thus directly 30 
incorporating any potential substitution from cemented to uncemented Hip Replacements 31 
over the time period. It provides, we believe, a stronger test of change is activity than any 32 
observed change in levels. 33 
 34 
The aggregated statistics used as controls for severity and patient characteristics are 35 
constructed as the mean values for each hospital, for the cases being investigated, derived 36 
from individual patient level data. These include age, sex and severity, measured by the 37 
Charlson co-morbidity index. The Charlson co-morbidity index controls for a total of 22 38 
conditions
10
, and is constructed by assigning a score to each co-morbid condition depending 39 
on the one-year risk of death associated with it, and summing these scores up (Charlson et al., 40 
1987). Finally, we also construct a measure of volume for each hospital, which simply 41 
measures the total number of Hip Replacements (both cemented and uncemented) undertaken 42 
at each hospital for every year of the data.  43 
 44 
                                                 
10
 These are Myocardial Infarction, Congestive Cardiac Failure, Peripheral Vascular disease, Dementia, 
Cerebrovascular disease, Chronic Lung disease, Connective Tissue disease, Ulcer, Chronic Liver disease, 
Hemiplegia, moderate or severe Kidney disease, Diabetes, Diabetes with complications, Tumor, Leukemia, 
Lymphoma, moderate or severe Liver disease, Malignant Tumor, Metastasis and AIDS. 
  10 
The aggregated dataset at the hospital level, described above, is then used to examine the 1 
differences in hospital activity across the two country settings and attributed to changes in 2 
English financial reimbursement rates.  3 
 4 
 5 
4. Methods 6 
 7 
We use regression analysis based on the proportion of uncemented Hip Replacements to test 8 
whether hospitals in the PbR environment had a higher uptake of these procedures, relative to 9 
hospitals in Scotland as they did not face changes in financial incentive and did not have to 10 
enforce the NICE clinical guidance. We use a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, as 11 








𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑅 + 𝛿(𝑃𝑏𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦) +  𝜆 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡) + 𝜓





In this, our preferred empirical specification, the dependent variable is the proportion of 13 
uncemented Hip Replacements to total (cemented + uncemented) Hip Replacement 14 
procedures at hospital h, during year t. The variable PbR is a dummy set equal to 1 from the 15 
year 2005 (the year PbR payment is attached to the separate Hip Replacement procedures in 16 
England). We interact this variable with our country identifier (country: England being the 17 
treatment country = 1; Scotland as control = 0). Finally, we include year dummies and a 18 
further number of controls relating to hospital (hospital type and volumes of Hip 19 
Replacement activity) and aggregate patient characteristics (average age, gender, co-20 
mobridity), as defined in the data section above.  21 
 22 
Our coefficient of interest is δ, as it captures the difference in the average proportional 23 
increase of uncemented Hip prostheses in each hospital in England before and after the 24 
introduction of PbR in England in 2005 minus the uptake in the average Scottish hospital (the 25 
control group), before and after the introduction of PbR in England. Holding all else constant 26 
the intercept, (α), captures the average proportion of uncemented hip prostheses in Scotland 27 
prior to 2005. Then, following standard DiD interpretation. The sum α + 𝛽 captures the 28 
uptake in uncemented prostheses in Scotland post 2005. Finally, the sum α + 𝛽 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 29 
captures the differential uptake in England compared to our control population after 2004. 30 
The inclusion of the time dummies provide a stronger test of the difference-in-difference 31 
estimate, δ.  32 
 33 
We test our difference-in-difference model, by running a difference in trends estimator to 34 
examine the different phases of policy identification. We adopt this differences-in-trends 35 
specification to take account of the manner of hospital procurement in Hip Replacement, as 36 
we expect individual hospitals to run down their stock and replace stock, in line with the 37 
change in financial incentives after the introduction of the PbR, through procurement 38 
changes. In other words, the policy impact we assume will roll-out over time and will not 39 
necessarily be a distinct one-off change in activity. In addition, we expect that once the 40 
financial incentive is removed (2009-2012), with the introduction of the new HRG grouper, 41 
and the Best Practice Tariffs, this procurement process may change as they become 42 
accustomed to the new financial incentives. This model is specified below:  43 
 44 
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑡   =  α + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛾𝑇 + 𝛿𝑃𝑏𝑅{𝑡 − 𝑡1̃|𝑡 ≥ ?̃?1} + 𝜁𝑃𝑏𝑅{𝑡 − ?̃?2|𝑡 ≥ ?̃?2} +
 𝜂𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝑃𝑏𝑅{𝑡 − 𝑡1̃|𝑡 ≥ ?̃?1} + 𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝑃𝑏𝑅{𝑡 − 𝑡2̃|𝑡 ≥ ?̃?2} +  𝜑𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡) +
 
(2) 
  11 
 ψ′𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡            
  
The dependent variable is the proportion of uncemented Hip Replacements to total (cemented 1 
+ uncemented), as in equation (1). Our yearly spline, represented by 𝑃𝑏𝑅{𝑡 − ?̃?|𝑡 ≥ ?̃?} where 2 
t is a running counter of the years since 1996, where ?̃?1 is the first break point in the spline, is 3 
set at the year 2005 (the year PbR payment is attached to the seperate Hip Replacement 4 
procedures in England), and  ?̃?2 is the break point in the spline again at 2009 when the 5 
incentive is removed.  We interact these variables with our country identifier (country: 6 
England being the treatment country = 1; Scotland as control = 0). The variable T is a time 7 
trend to capture any systematic changes in practice over time, and as with the other models 8 
we include a further number of controls relating to hospital and patient characteristics and 9 
year dummies.   10 
 11 
Imposing restrictions 𝛾 = 𝜑 = 0 returns a standard difference-in-trends estimator. More 12 
generally, 𝜂 and θ, are the coefficients of interest as they are the spline-based difference-in-13 
trends estimators that captures the difference in the average uptake of uncemented Hip 14 
prostheses in each hospital in England before and after the introduction of PbR in England in 15 
2005 (and after its removal in 2009) minus the uptake in the average Scottish hospital (the 16 
control group). Holding all else constant the intercept, (α), captures the average volume of 17 
uncemented hip prostheses in Scotland prior to 2005. Then, following standard DiD 18 
interpretation α + 𝛽 captures the incremental uptake in uncemented prostheses in England 19 
prior to 2005. The sum α + 𝛿 captures the uptake in uncemented prostheses in Scotland post 20 
2005, while α + 𝜁 captures the uptake in uncemented prostheses in Scotland post 2009. 21 
Finally, the sum α + 𝛽 + 𝛿 + 𝜂 captures the differential uptake in England compared to our 22 
control population after 2005, and the sum α + 𝛽 + 𝜁 + 𝜃 captures the differential uptake 23 
after 2009. The inclusion of the time trend and the time trend country interaction provides a 24 
stronger test of the difference-in-trends estimates, 𝜂 and θ.  25 
 26 
As a final test on our basic specification we run an additional specification that allows us to 27 
make better use of the individual patient level data. In particular, we are interested in 28 
controlling for any individual patient characteristics which may increase the likelihood of 29 
receiving a cemented or uncemented Hip Replacement. To do this we estimate the hospital-30 
specific effect on uncemented activity, θ, from a patient-level equation of the form: 31 
  32 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖ℎ𝑡  = 𝜃ℎ𝑡 + γ′𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡          




where the dependent variable is uncemented Hip Replacement, X is a set of patient 34 
characteristics (age, sex, co-morbidity, type of admission), ε is the error term, and i indexes 35 
the individual patient. The model is estimated separately for each year of the data in our 36 
sample (1996-2012) and the estimate, θ, is extracted. We then use θ as the dependent variable 37 
in our difference in difference model as specified above, in equation (3).  38 
 39 
 40 
𝜃ℎ𝑡 =   𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛾𝑃𝑏𝑅 + 𝛿(𝑃𝑏𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦) +  𝜆 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡) + 𝜓
′𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡   
           
(4) 
 41 
All models are run with standard errors clustered at the hospital level and with random 42 
effects. The hospitals, h, are split into the treatment (England) and control (Scotland) groups, 43 
foregoing the ability to estimate hospital fixed effects, except of course in the two-stage 44 
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estimation procedure. While this allows us to exploit the weaker rank condition of the 1 
random effects estimator, all specifications include three variables to control for the types of 2 
hospitals in the sample. These include teaching hospitals in both Scotland and England, and 3 
Foundation Trusts (FTs) hospitals in England, which have a degree of independent self-4 
management power compared to normal NHS hospitals, and Independent Sector Treatment 5 
Centres (ISTCs), essentially privately owned specialised treatments centres located only in 6 
England. ISTCs were introduced from 2005 onwards, and many were specifically created to 7 
provide Hip Replacement. FTs were first introduced in 2004, but each year more trusts 8 
gained this status. The dummy variable reflects this, and is “turned-on” the year a Trust earns 9 
Foundation status.  10 
 11 
A number of further robustness checks are also run against these specifications. To ensure 12 
that the trend in activity is similar across the two countries prior to the introduction of the 13 
incentive; by running the same models on the sample from 1996-2003, the years before PbR 14 
was introduced in England, using 2002 as the falsified ‘policy-on’ date. We also test the basic 15 
specification excluding ‘centres of excellence’ (London, Glasgow and Edinburgh) in the two 16 
countries, to control for instances where uncemented activity may reflect “innovative” 17 
activity as opposed to motivation through financial incentive. Finally we also run two 18 
specifications of the standard difference-in-difference estimator, separately for the emergency 19 
and elective Hip Replacement activity to identify whether the effect is significant for each 20 
group individually, given the difference in potential cost savings between them and the 21 




  24 
5. Results 25 
 26 
Our sample on average contained 230 hospitals in any year, (194 English and 36 Scottish), 27 
that performed Hip Replacement as identified by OPCS procedure codes over the year 1996 28 
to 2012. As not all hospitals performed Hip Replacements every year we have an unbalanced 29 
panel sample of about 4,000 observations. In reporting results we concentrate on the main 30 
coefficients of interest. Table 3 presents our OLS estimates of the difference-in-difference 31 
estimator using the main specifications outlined above. Our main coefficient of interest is the 32 
coefficient on the interaction between the PbR dummy and our country variable (coded with 33 
England=1). This is coefficient γ and is the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of 34 
the introduction of the PbR reimbursement after 2005 for the proportion of uncemented Hip 35 
Replacement in England.  36 
 37 
< Insert Table 3 here > 38 
 39 
The first four columns of Table 3, present the results as estimated by equation (1). In all 40 
specifications of this model, the coefficient is appropriately signed and highly significant, 41 
indicating that after the introduction of PbR in England, as compared to Scotland, the 42 
financial incentive operated to increase the uptake of the relatively more expensive Hip 43 
prosthesis, even although NICE clinical guidance favoured the less expensive substitute. 44 
While the difference-in-difference estimate is small, with the result suggesting that each 45 
hospital in England increased its proportion of uncemented hip prostheses by 0.2 per year 46 
compared to the period prior to the introduction of PbR and in the control setting (Scotland) 47 
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 In both countries elective procedures dominate and are similar across the timeframe studied (approximately 
89% in England and 70% in Scotland). 
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where the financial incentive was not introduced. The coefficient is robust to the exclusion of 1 
control variables, as also seen in Table 3.  2 
 3 
Finally, the last two columns of Table 3, present the results from OLS estimates difference-4 
in-trends estimator using the linear splines specification. Our main coefficients of interest are 5 
those on the interaction between the time trend variables (2005-2012 trend and 2009-2012 6 
trend) and our country variable (coded with England=1). These are coefficients 𝜂 and 𝜃, 7 
which report the difference-in-trends estimate of the effect of the introduction of the PbR 8 
reimbursement after 2005, and its removal in 2009, for uncemented Hip Replacement in 9 
England. Coefficient 𝜂 is positive, and suggests that each hospital in England increased it’s 10 
up-take of uncemented hip prostheses by 5.1 per year compared to the period prior to the 11 
introduction of PbR and in the control setting (Scotland) where the financial incentive was 12 
not introduced. Coefficient 𝜃 is negative, and suggests that each hospital in England 13 
decreased it’s up-take of uncemented hip prostheses by 4.1 per year compared to the period 14 
when the differential incentive was in place and in the control setting (Scotland). This implies 15 
that across the 257 English hospitals in our sample in 2009, an additional 1,311 uncemented 16 
Hip Replacements were performed as a result of the financial incentive that would not have 17 
been performed otherwise. 18 
 19 
Table 4 presents the results as estimated by equation (4), from the two-stage model. In this 20 
specification the coefficient of interest is again appropriately signed and highly significant, 21 
indicating a step-change difference in activity of around 10, suggesting that each hospital in 22 
England increased it’s up-take of uncemented hip prostheses by around 10 compared to the 23 
period prior to the introduction of the incentive and relative to Scotland. This implies that 24 
across the 257 English hospitals in our sample in 2009, an additional 2,570 uncemented Hip 25 
Replacements were performed as a result of the financial incentive, controlling for patient 26 
characteristics
12
.  27 
 28 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the results from the additional robustness checks. We report the 29 
trend tests in Table 5, where we run the same model on the sample of years before the PbR 30 
policy was introduced (1996-2003) with a proxy PbR introduction date (2002). The results 31 
indicate that the difference-in-trend and difference-in-difference estimates are no longer 32 
significant when we use an earlier year (2002) for our break-point. We use 2003 as the prior 33 
date here to avoid any confounding of the policy on date, as by 2004 the reimbursement tariff 34 
structure for hip replacement was in place, although it was set at a common level across both 35 
prosthesis types. 36 
 37 
Table 6, presents the results from the tests excluding the hospitals from the ‘centres of 38 
excellence’, which are run to ensure that the increase in uncemented procedures is not 39 
occurring only in certain geographical regions. The basic specification is tested on samples 40 
excluding hospitals based in London, London and Glasgow and London, Glasgow and 41 
Edinburgh. The result is robust to all these specifications, and remains significant at p<0.01. 42 
The coefficient size slightly increases when the Scottish centres are excluded, as they are 43 
largely accounting for the uncemented activity.  44 
 45 
<Insert Table 4 here> 46 
 47 
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 To test this finding we also run the model on the sample 1996-2010 – the years the financial incentive is in 
place - and the coefficient is stable in both size and magnitude.  
  14 
<Insert Table 5 here> 1 
 2 
<Insert Table 6 here> 3 
 4 
Finally, Table 7 explicitly tests the basic specification using the proportions elective and 5 
emergency uncemented activity to total activity, as well as the levels of elective and 6 
emergency activity as dependent variables. The treatment effect remains significant for both 7 
elective and emergency procedures, and as expected is of greater magnitude in the elective 8 
specification which accounts for more of the Hip Replacement activity. In the levels models, 9 
we include variables for the levels of the other forms of activity (cemented, emergency and 10 
elective) to see if there is any substitution away from cemented to uncemented, and away 11 
from elective to emergency – where the financial incentive is stronger. While in both cases 12 
the coefficient is negative on cemented activity, suggesting substitution from cemented to 13 
uncemented prosthesis, it is only significant in the case of elective Hip Replacements. The 14 
coefficient on the emergency and elective coefficients are positive, suggesting that cases are 15 
increasing for both types of admission, and no substitution is occurring between them.  16 
 17 
 18 
6. Conclusion 19 
 20 
There is a general belief that financial incentives affect clinical and hospital behaviour. There 21 
have been a number of studies which have substantiated this belief in relating the introduction 22 
of fixed price payments (DRG payments) and competition for patients to improvements in 23 
hospital quality, both in the NHS and abroad (see for example Cooper et al, 2011; Gaynor et 24 
al, 2012; Kessler and Geppert et al, 2005). The mechanism through which this operates has 25 
been open to debate, although improvements in general hospital management are evoked to 26 
uphold these findings. Some previous literature has also found distortion in clinical practice 27 
arising from the introduction of DRGs as reimbursement is tied to length of stay (Feder et al., 28 
1987; Newhouse & Byrne, 1988; Shen, 2003; Theurl & Winner, 2007). 29 
 30 
This is the first study to focus attention on highly substitutable procedures that are subject to 31 
different reimbursement levels, to assess whether financial incentives affect clinical practice. 32 
It has been commonly claimed as part of the managed care literature that clinical activity will 33 
shift in response to a financial incentive, but there has little rigorous, empirical evidence to 34 
uphold the claim. We have been able to employ a difference-in-difference approach to 35 
analyse the effect within the UK NHS as, while England adopted different reimbursement 36 
levels for uncemented and cemented Hip Replacements, over the same period Scotland did 37 
not. Our results suggest that the English NHS experienced much higher, relative uptake rates 38 
of the more generously reimbursed, and presumably more profitable uncemented Hip 39 
Replacements than Scotland, once PbR had been introduced in England. This increase 40 
ensued, despite the fact that clinical guidance recommending cemented Hip Replacements 41 
had been produced by NICE, which is considered a benchmark for regulating English 42 
hospital activity. The generosity of the reimbursement, with the presumed higher mark-up 43 
given published reference costs for the procedure, coupled with a centralised procurement 44 
activity appears however to have led hospitals to pursue a management policy which is at 45 
odds with the national clinical guidance over the period of study. 46 
 47 
This is an important finding. This conclusion is specific to this particular, perhaps unique 48 
case but the finding does support the view, and provides much needed empirical evidence, 49 
that financial incentives can trump clinical guidance. It may be that the management policies 50 
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that react to financial incentives are easier to pursue where hospitals practice centralised 1 
procurement of course. We know that financial incentives guide clinical practice in other 2 
areas (Gravelle et al. 2010). What is of interest in this case study is the financial incentive 3 
appears to lead to behaviour that contradicts national clinical guidance on hip prosthesis. It 4 
could be that clinical pressure is not brought to bear in this particular case as the different 5 
types of prosthesis appear to be highly substitutable and the clinical outcomes are similar 6 
regardless of the prosthesis used. That said on the introduction of best practice traffic within 7 
England, where no reimbursement difference is maintain across the prosthesis, data show a 8 
marked trend towards cemented prosthesis and a slowing down in uncemented activity.  9 
While other reforms are taking place around this time it is difficult to define a reform, other 10 
than the change in financial incentive and the NICE clinical guidance, that impacts 11 
differentially on use of specific prothesis type. However, we are not able to rigorously 12 
analyse the effect after the removal of the incentive, as we have only two years worth of data 13 
past 2010, but where we do control for this further change in financial incentive are results 14 
hold. The findings for our study period are however clear, on the introduction of PbR in 15 
England more generous reimbursement led to a greater volume of uncemented prosthesis use, 16 
a prosthesis which is relatively more expensive than the close substitute and which was not 17 
supported by clinical guidance. 18 
19 
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Tables and Figures 1 
Figure 1: Timeline 2 
 3 
 4 
Figure 2: Cemented and Uncemented Hip Replacement cases, England and Scotland 1996-2012 5 
  6 
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Figure 3: Ratio of Uncemented Hip Replacement cases to Total*, England and Scotland 1996-1 
2012 2 
 3 
*Total is measured as the sum of cemented (W371) and uncemented (W381) replacements. 4 
 5 
Figure 4: Frequency of uncemented Hip Replacement cases to total* by provider, England and 6 
Scotland, selected years. 7 
 8 
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Table 1: English National Tariffs and Costs for Hip HRGs 1 
 




















Spell Tariff (£) 2005/6 Cemented (H80) 7,508 5,379 
n/a n/a 




Spell Tariff (£) 2005/6 Uncemented (H81) 7,663 5,173 




Spell Tariff (£) 2006/7 Cemented (H80) 7,529 5,176 
897 131 
National Average Unit Cost (£) 2003/4 Cemented (H80) 4,744 4,977 
Spell Tariff (£) 2006/7 Uncemented (H81) 8,286 4,967 
National Average Unit Cost (£) 2003/4 Uncemented (H81) 4,604 4,637 
Spell Tariff (£) 2007/8 Cemented (H80) 7,717 5,305 
1,482 -8 
National Average Unit Cost (£) 2004/5 Cemented (H80) 5,759 5,379 
Spell Tariff (£) 2007/8 Uncemented (H81) 8,493 5,091 
National Average Unit Cost (£) 2004/5 Uncemented (H81) 5,053 5,173 
Spell Tariff (£) 2008/9 Cemented (H80) 7,304 5,220 
1,692 372 
National Average Unit Cost (£) 2005/6 Cemented (H80) 5,972 5,521 
Spell Tariff (£) 2008/9 Uncemented (H81) 7,816 5,587 
National Average Unit Cost (£) 2005/6 Uncemented (H81) 4,792 5,516 
Source: Department of HRG Tariff (2004/5; 2005/6; 2006/7; 2007/08; 2008/09; 2009/10); Department of 2 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for extracted Hip Replacement Sample, Scotland and England 1 
1996-2012 2 
Year Number of Hospitals Average Age % Male 
  England Scotland England Scotland England Scotland 
1996 150 34 66 71 36 30 
1997 155 37 66 72 36 27 
1998 155 36 66 72 37 32 
1999 153 32 66 72 37 31 
2000 156 34 67 72 38 32 
2001 179 33 68 73 38 33 
2002 190 34 68 72 38 30 
2003 189 38 69 69 39 38 
2004 196 36 69 70 39 33 
2005 226 41 69 69 39 34 
2006 180 40 69 70 37 34 
2007 191 43 69 69 36 36 
2008 243 24 69 70 38 36 
2009 257 44 69 71 38 34 
2010 291 39 69 72 38 36 
2011 299 38 69 69 38 36 
2012 308 40 68 71 40 39 
 3 
4 
  23 
Table 3: Results from Basic Specification 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
DiD DiD DiD DiD Spline Spline 
              
Controls  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       PbR 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.0517 0.1652 
  
 
(0.0400) (0.0350) (0.0318) (0.0442) 
  Country 0.0593** 0.0623*** 0.0719** 0.0398** 0.0941*** 0.0376 
 
(0.0253) (0.0228) (0.0286) (0.0231) (0.0244) (0.0235) 
PbR*country 0.215*** 0.185*** 0.155*** 0.319*** 
  
 
(0.0366) (0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0516) 
  Year Trend 
    
-0.00359 -0.24584 
     
(0.00937) (0.01878) 
2005-2009 Trend 
    
0.0666* 0.1359* 
     
(0.0373) (0.0753) 
2009-2012 Trend 
    
-0.0633 -0.1329* 
     
(0.0386) (0.0712) 
2005-2009 Trend*Country 
    
0.0510*** 0.0535*** 
     
(0.0123) (0.0202) 
2009-2012 Trend*Country 
    
-0.0406** -0.0198** 
     
(0.0201) (0.0391) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies*Country No  No  No  Yes No  Yes 
Constant 0.0785** 0.0248 0.0684* 0.1016* 7.214 49.17 
 
(0.0367) (0.0189) (0.0409) (0.0342) (18.71) (0.0361) 
       Observations 3,970 3,971 3,970 3,970 3,970 3,970 
Hospitals 476 477 476 476 476 476 
R-squared 0.310 0.297 0.243 0.243 0.306 0.314 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      The full results for our preferred specification are reported in the Appendix. Full results for all specifications, 2 
showing coefficients on controls (which are stable across all specifications) are available on request from the 3 
authors. 4 
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Table 4: Results from Two-Stage Models  1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
2stage 2stage 2stage 2stage 
      
  Controls Yes No Yes Yes 
     PbR 0.375*** 0.361*** 0.206*** 0.282*** 
 
(0.0211) (0.0199) (0.0174) -0.0254 
Country 0.0774*** 0.0620*** 0.0704*** 0.0644*** 
 
(0.0173) (0.0162) (0.0177) -0.0188 
PbR*country 0.129*** 0.106*** 0.0881*** 0.2406*** 
 
(0.0230) (0.0204) (0.0231) -0.0341 
Year Dummies Yes Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies*Country No No No Yes 
Constant 0.290*** 0.286*** 0.282*** 0.282*** 
 
(0.0148) (0.0135) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
     Observations 4,150 4,150 4,150 4,150 
Hospitals 507 507 507 507 
R-squared 0.483 0.472 0.356 0.486 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     2 
 3 
Table 5: Trend Tests 4 
  Years 1996-2003 
 
DiD 2stage 
      
Controls Yes Yes 
   PbR (2002) 0.0618*** -0.0301*** 
 
(0.0173) (0.0115) 
Country 0.0589** 0.0664*** 
 
(0.0242) (0.0160) 
Country*PbR 0.00750 -0.0174 
 
(0.0152) (0.0140) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 0.101*** 0.299*** 
 
(0.0385) (0.0213) 
   Observations 1,553 1,607 
Hospitals 253 273 
R-squared 0.0413 0.0651 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls include: age, sex, co-morbidity and hospital type for all specifications 5 
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Table 6: Geographic Test   1 





Excluding London, Glasgow, 
Edinburgh 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    PbR 0.240*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 
 
(0.0397) (0.0433) (0.0451) 
Country 0.0530** 0.0498* 0.0393 
 
(0.0246) (0.0267) (0.0280) 
Country*PbR 0.213*** 0.226*** 0.229*** 
 
(0.0370) (0.0396) (0.0411) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0865** 0.0782** 0.0778** 
 
(0.0378) (0.0376) (0.0383) 
    Observations 3,697 3,602 3,556 
Number of h 453 446 440 
R-squared 0.316 0.311 0.310 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Controls include: age, sex, co-morbidity and hospital type for all specifications 2 
 3 
Table 7: Emergency and Elective Models  4 
  Uncemented Proportions Uncemented Levels 
 
Elective Emergency Elective Emergency 
          
Cemented Levels (Elective) 
  
-0.00457*** -0.0575 
   
(0.000717) (0.0371) 
Cemented Levels (Emergency) 
  
0.0711*** -0.514 
   
(0.0163) (0.397) 




   
(0.00341) 
 Unemented Levels (Emergency) 
   
6.583*** 
    
(0.792) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     PbR 174.7** 4.477** 0.944*** 43.05*** 
 
(78.27) (2.254) (0.304) (8.345) 
Country 1,052*** 31.66*** 0.240 14.84*** 
 
(223.5) (6.994) (0.175) (4.193) 
Country*PbR 245.4** 7.399** 1.277*** 51.53*** 
 
(120.6) (3.672) (0.312) (9.804) 
Constant 964.1* 24.91 -0.26 -8.479 
 
(565.3) (16.31) -0.23 -5.467 
Year Dummies  No No Yes Yes 
     Observations 3,970 3,970 4,169 4,169 
Hospitals 476 476 512 512 
R-squared 0.201 0.199 0.373 0.347 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Controls include: age, sex, co-morbidity and hospital type for all specifications, they also include total volume 5 
for the proportions specifications.   6 
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Appendix 1: Full results from Basic Specifications  1 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (6) 
 
DiD DiD DiD 2stage 2stage 2stage Spline 
            
  Age 66-70 -0.0115 
 
-0.0202 






   
(0.0190) 
Age 71-76 -0.0566*** 
 
-0.0738*** 






   
(0.0217) 
Age 77+ -0.0632 
 
-0.153*** 











































































 PbR 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.0517 0.375*** 0.361*** 0.206*** 
 
 
(0.0400) (0.0350) (0.0318) (0.0211) (0.0199) (0.0174) 
 Country 0.0593** 0.0623*** 0.0719** 0.0774*** 0.0620*** 0.0704*** 0.0985*** 
 
(0.0253) (0.0228) (0.0286) (0.0173) (0.0162) (0.0177) (0.0238) 
PbR*country 0.215*** 0.185*** 0.155*** 0.129*** 0.106*** 0.0881*** 
 
 
(0.0366) (0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0230) (0.0204) (0.0231) 
 Year Trend 
      
-0.00215 
       
(0.00936) 
2005-2009 Trend 
      
0.0638* 
       
(0.0374) 
2009-2012 Trend 
      
-0.0616 
       
(0.0386) 
2005-2009 Trend*Country 
      
0.0514*** 
       
(0.0123) 
2009-2012 Trend*Country 
      
-0.0408** 
       
(0.0201) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0785** 0.0248 0.0684* 0.290*** 0.286*** 0.282*** 4.332 
 
(0.0367) (0.0189) (0.0409) (0.0148) (0.0135) (0.0149) (18.68) 
        Observations 3,970 3,971 3,970 4,150 4,150 4,150 3,970 
Hospitals 476 477 476 507 507 507 476 
R-squared 0.310 0.297 0.243 0.483 0.472 0.356 0.311 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    2 
